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This study examines the impact of Regulation G in 2003 and the issuance of Compliance and 
Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs) in 2010 – on the reporting of non-GAAP earnings. The 
study finds that (i) both Regulation G and C&DIs are associated with an increase in the 
quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions (i.e. the exclusions are more transitory and have 
less predictive power for future operating earnings); (ii) Regulation G led to a decrease in 
the amount of total positive exclusions used to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, but C&DIs 
partially reversed this result; and (iii) Regulation G increases, and C&DIs decrease,  the 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs).  
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1. Introduction  
Over the past two decades, the reporting of non-GAAP earnings (also known as “pro-
forma”, “street”, or “core” earnings) has increased dramatically (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; 
Kolev et al., 2008). In 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) raised 
concerns regarding the potential misuse of non-GAAP reporting and intervened to regulate 
the reporting of non-GAAP earnings by issuing Regulation G. The SEC also amended Item 
10(e) of Regulation S-K in 2003 by imposing additional disclosure requirements and 
restrictions on firms when non-GAAP financial measures are included in their SEC filings. 
Subsequently, in 2010, the SEC issued new Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations 
(C&DIs). The C&DIs relaxed the rigorous guidelines (Form 8-K Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs) on Regulation G and Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K without changing the current 
regulation.
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This study investigates the effects of both Regulation G and C&DIs on the quality of 
exclusions from non-GAAP reporting on accounting information. Specifically, the objectives 
of this study are to examine: (i) whether there is an association between the exclusions and 
future operating earnings, (ii) whether positive non-GAAP exclusions are associated with 
firm’s meeting or slightly exceeding analysts’ forecasts, and (iii) the market response to 
earnings announcements before and after Regulation G and C&DIs. Consistent with prior 
studies, high quality exclusions are defined as those that are more transitory and have less 
predictive power for future operating earnings (e.g. Doyle et al., 2003; Gu and Chen, 2004; 
Kolev et al., 2008). 
The motivation for this study is two-fold. First, this study exploits two SEC interventions 
to investigate whether they achieved their desired outcomes. The two SEC interventions are: 
the SEC’s implementation of Regulation G in 2003, imposing additional disclosure and filing 
requirements on firms publicly disclosing non-GAAP earnings; and the SEC’s issuance of new 
C&DIs in 2010. The restrictive guidelines of Regulation G are aimed at mitigating the 
improper use of non-GAAP reporting. Empirical findings tend to support the implementation 
of Regulation G, as it improves the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions and curtails 
opportunistic behaviour by firms (e.g. Frankel et al., 2011; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 
2008). However, concerns were raised regarding the significant “administrative burden” 
imposed on firms that disclosed non-GAAP earnings (specifically those adjusting for 
recurring items) under Regulation G. This resulted in the SEC issuing new C&DIs. The new 
C&DIs relaxed the regulatory environment and eliminated the “administrative burden” 
associated with the exclusion of recurring items.
3
 The C&DIs provides an interesting setting 
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 Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K applies additional and more stringent requirements to periodic reports 
and other documents filed with the SEC – this includes non-GAAP financial measures (Source: 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm). Questions 102.03 and 102.04 
are examples where C&DIs relaxed the rigorous guidelines of Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K. 
2
  For example, Question 8 (Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K) previously required firms to “demonstrate the 
usefulness of any measure that excludes recurring items”. The burden of demonstrating “usefulness” 
was a major hurdle that discouraged firms from disclosing non-GAAP earnings. The new C&DIs 
eliminate this hurdle by giving firms flexibility in adjusting for recurring items, provided these items 
are not labelled as non-recurring. 
3
 For example, Regulation G requires firms to show a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measure 
to the GAAP financial measure. Regulation G also discourages firms from reporting non-GAAP 





to examine whether a more relaxed environment encouraged or discouraged firms to better 
communicate with shareholders through non-GAAP earnings. Empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of the issuance of C&DIs is limited (the notable exception being Kyung and 
Weintrop, 2016).  
The second motivation is to add to the debate on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. 
Extant research proposes competing theories to explain the use of non-GAAP earnings. On 
one hand, the information hypothesis proposes that excluding transitory items when 
estimating non-GAAP earnings enables managers to provide enhanced earnings 
measurement (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; 
Frankel and Roychowdhury, 2005; Kolev et al., 2008). On the other hand, the opportunism 
hypothesis argues that excluding certain income-decreasing components enables managers 
to report non-GAAP earnings metrics that exceed GAAP earnings figures (Black and 
Christensen, 2009; Brown et al., 2012; Doyle et al., 2003; McVay, 2006). In this study, equal 
weight is placed on these two hypotheses; both motives could affect managers’ non-GAAP 
earnings disclosure practice, and it is difficult to determine which motivation is more 
pervasive.  
Consistent with Doyle et al. (2003) and Kolev et al. (2008), this study separates non-
GAAP earnings exclusions into special items (i.e. typically regarded as transitory or non-
recurring) and other exclusions.
4
 This study first documents that the quality of exclusions 
has improved following Regulation G and C&DIs (i.e. exclusions are more transitory). 
Specifically, the study documents that the negative association between non-GAAP 
exclusions (total exclusions, special items and other exclusions) and future operating 
performance becomes less negative post-Regulation G and post-C&DIs. Second, this study 
documents that the positive association between total positive exclusions and the 
probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts becomes less positive after Regulation 
G, but more positive after C&DIs. 
5
 Third, the market response test produces opposite 
results for Regulation G and C&DIs. Specifically, the coefficient on earnings surprise (ERC) 
increases post-Regulation G but reduces post-C&DIs, suggesting that more informative 
earnings are being announced after Regulation G, but this effect is reduced by C&DIs. 
Overall, the results suggest that Regulation G and C&DIs had effects: Regulation G, as 
intended, yielded higher quality exclusions; a reduction in the amount of total positive 
exclusions used to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts; and higher ERCs. In contrast, while the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4
 Doyle et al. (2003) divide total exclusions into special items and other exclusions and recognize special 
items as one-time items, such as gains or losses on assets, merger and acquisition costs, stock-related 
charges, and restructuring charges, while other exclusions include recurring items such as 
depreciation and amortization expenses, stock-based compensation costs, R&D expenses, as well as 
other adjustments including interest-related charges, tax-related costs and investment costs. 
5
  In a similar study, Heflin and Hsu (2008) find a decrease in the likelihood of meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts following Regulation G, which is consistent with the interpretation of the findings in 
findings presented here. The main difference between this study and that of Heflin and Hsu (2008) is 
that Heflin and Hsu (2008) focus on the impact of Regulation G on the probability to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecast, whereas this study focuses on the how Regulation G impacts on the use of positive 
exclusions to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (i.e. the interaction term between Regulation G and 
positive exclusions). The results reported in Table 6 suggest that Regulation G reduced the amount of 






introduction of C&DIs resulted in higher quality exclusions, they did not reduce the amount 
of total exclusions used to meet or beat analyst’s forecasts and resulted in lower ERCs. 
This study makes numerous contributions to the literature. First, this study extends the 
study by Kolev et al. (2008) by documenting that the quality of non-GAAP exclusions also 
increased post-C&DIs, despite C&DIs not being an actual regulation. Second, this study 
extends the study by Heflin and Hsu (2008) by investigating how Regulation G and C&DIs 
impacted on the amount of positive exclusions used to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
Third, this study extends the investigation of non-GAAP reporting – beyond consideration of 
how the non-GAAP announcement information maps into future earnings and analyst 
accuracy – to demonstrate the impact that institutional changes have on the 
informativeness of earnings, through ERCs. Hence, this research adds to a growing body of 
literature that investigates the consequences of Regulation G (e.g. Heflin and Hsu, 2008; 
Kolev et al., 2008) and the emerging literature that investigates the consequences of C&DIs 
(Kyung and Weintrop, 2016). The results reported in this study add to the disclosure 
regulation literature by providing empirical evidence on the economic consequences of 
regulations, which may curtail the frequency and quality of non-GAAP reporting. 
The remainder of this study is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
Regulation G and the C&DIs, reviews previous literature on non-GAAP earnings, and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 provides a description of the sample selection and 
research design to test the hypotheses. The results are outlined in Section 4, and Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Regulatory setting, literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Regulatory setting and literature review 
Non-GAAP earnings reporting became increasingly prevalent during the 1990s 
(Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). Non-GAAP figures tend to be more value-relevant, on average, 
than GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Frankel and 
Roychowdhury, 2005). The rationale put forward by managers and in the business press is 
that the exclusions from non-GAAP earnings are regarded as being transitory and non-
recurring, non-cash, or uninformative of the firm's core operating earnings (Doyle et al., 
2003; Gu and Chen, 2004). Numerous studies have found evidence supporting this 
perspective (i.e. the information hypothesis) of non-GAAP earnings. For instance, Lougee 
and Marquardt (2004) find that non-GAAP earnings help predict future profitability when a 
firm’s GAAP earnings informativeness is low and that this firm is more likely to report non-
GAAP figures. Empirical evidence also suggests that investors consider non-GAAP earnings as 
a more informative figure (e.g. Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004).  
However, it is possible for firms to use non-GAAP earnings disclosures opportunistically. 
Non-GAAP earnings disclosures are less regulated and therefore self-determined by 
corporate managers. For example, Doyle et al. (2003) find that non-GAAP earnings 
exclusions have predictive ability for future operating earnings and abnormal returns, which 
indicates that these exclusions may be recurring in the subsequent period. Furthermore, 
managers seem to use non-GAAP earnings financial metrics to meet or exceed analysts’ 
forecasts (Doyle et al., 2013; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). 
On January 22, 2003, the SEC introduced Regulation G to regulate the reporting of non-





of non-GAAP earnings. The reconciliation and management-description provisions of the 
regulations were intended to make opportunism of non-GAAP earnings reporting 
transparent and costly, thus enhancing the quality of the exclusions from non-GAAP 
earnings. Empirical evidence is consistent with this view. For example, Kolev et al. (2008) 
find that after Regulation G, the components excluded from non-GAAP earnings are of 
greater quality by documenting that these exclusions are transitory and non-recurring.
6
 
However, the disclosure requirements under Regulation G imposed a significant 
administrative burden on firms. This resulted in some firms abandoning the reporting of 
non-GAAP earnings metrics in their press releases (Heflin and Hsu, 2008).
7
 
Motivated by concerns that the restrictive nature of Regulation G precludes firms from 
providing meaningful non-GAAP information, the SEC issued new interpretive guidance 
(C&DIs) on January 11, 2010. This interpretive guidance replaced earlier guidance from 2003 
and 2004 relating to the FAQs.
8
 For example, Question 8 previously imposed considerable 
burden on firms by requiring them to “demonstrate the usefulness of any measure that 
excludes recurring items”. Demonstrating “usefulness” was a major hurdle that may have 
discouraged firms from disclosing non-GAAP earnings. The new C&DIs eliminate this hurdle 
and allow firms flexibility in adjusting for recurring items, provided these items are not 
labelled as non-recurring.
9
 Figure 1 presents a timeline of Regulation G and C&DIs. 
As C&DIs are non-statutory, it is possible for firms to not respond to them. Alternatively, 
these interpretations may function as efficiently as an actual regulation (for instance, where 
firms seek to comply with the C&DIs in order to minimise the risk of investigation or 
prosecution by the SEC (Kyung and Weintrop, 2016)). Thus, the interpretations may 
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 Kolev et al. (2008) report that the quality of exclusions increased following the intervention of the SEC 
into non-GAAP reporting (post-Regulation G). Furthermore, their results indicate that the average 
quality has improved and that the firms that stopped releasing non-GAAP financial metrics generally 
tended to have lower quality exclusions before the SEC intervention period. However, they also find 
that the quality of special items has declined following SEC intervention, as managers adapted to the 
new disclosure environment by switching more recurring expenses into special items. This result 
highlights the unintended consequences arising from Regulation G (Kolev et al., 2008). 
7
 Heflin and Hsu (2008) find that Regulation G generated: (i) a modest decrease in non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures, (ii) a decrease in the magnitude of the differences between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
(i.e. total exclusions), (iii) a modest decrease in the probability firms report non-GAAP earnings that 
meet or slightly exceed analysts’ expectations, and (iv) a decrease in the relation between returns and 
earnings forecast errors. They conclude the regulation reduced the frequency and magnitude of non-
GAAP earnings because the regulations enhanced managerial emphasis upon GAAP earnings. They 
also find that, before the regulation, managers were using other exclusions to help them meet or 
exceed the earnings forecast benchmarks and that the regulation has helped reduce this opportunistic 
managerial behaviour. 
8
 Form 8-K is the form on which public companies report, on a current basis, the occurrence of 
significant corporate events. A reportable event is a transaction or occurrence of major significance 
that identifies the non-GAAP financial measures contained in the incorporated reports and provides 
the required reconciliation. The SEC periodically expands the list of items requiring disclosure on 
Form 8-K and alters the time within which a Form 8-K must be filed (Source: 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm).  
9
 For instance, prior guidance prohibited firms to adjust a non-GAAP financial performance measure to 
eliminate or smooth items identified as “non-recurring, infrequent, or unusual” when the nature of 
the charge or gain is such that it is reasonably likely to recur within two years or there was a similar 
charge or gain within the prior two years. The new C&DIs (Question 102.03) clarifies that this 
prohibition is based on the “description” of the charge or gain being adjusted. In particular, firms can 
adjust for the charge or gain as they deem appropriate, as long as this charge or gain is not described 





influence SEC registrants’ disclosure practices even though they are non-binding (Kyung and 
Weintrop, 2016). Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of C&DIs is scarce, with the 
exception of Kyung and Weintrop (2016). Using data from 2006 to 2013, they first examine 
3-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of C&DIs for two groups 
of firms: (i) firms reporting non-GAAP earnings informatively, and (ii) firms reporting non-
GAAP earnings aggressively.
10
 They find that the announcement of the new C&DIs is 
positively associated with the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns for firms reporting non-
GAAP earnings informatively. Their results suggest that investors viewed C&DIs as an 
important SEC intervention, despite the fact that the C&DIs are non-statutory, and they 
affected managers’ reporting behaviours, although the benefits appeared to be limited to 
firms using non-GAAP reporting informatively. The authors then turned their attention to 
aggressive non-GAAP reporters in the post-C&DIs period and find that managers are more 
likely to report non-GAAP earnings aggressively when the firm’s corporate governance 
system is poor. Overall their findings highlight that the introduction of C&DIs is an 
economically important event which improved the quality of information contained in 
voluntary disclosures. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
Theory suggests that both the information and the opportunism hypotheses explain 
managers’ non-GAAP reporting decisions. Empirical findings support both hypotheses. 
Consistent with the information hypothesis, non-GAAP earnings have been found to be 
more informative to investors relative to GAAP financial metrics, when GAAP earnings are 
more subjective (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and 
Sivakumar, 2003; Choi et al., 2007; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). Non-GAAP financial 
metrics are also more predictive of future performance, consistent with these earnings 
numbers providing a better representation of “core” earnings (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). 
However, consistent with the opportunism hypothesis, empirical findings suggest that 
exclusions of transitory losses from non-GAAP earnings are related to future operating 
performance, suggesting that these exclusions recur in subsequent periods of firm’s financial 
reporting (e.g. Black and Christensen, 2009; Kolev et al., 2008; McVay, 2006).  
The first and second hypotheses of this study address the quality of exclusions, while the 
third hypothesis explores the relevance of non-GAAP earnings for market participants. The 
first hypothesis, like Kolev et al. (2008), postulates a quality change for total exclusions, 
measured by the relationship of exclusions and non-GAAP earnings with future earnings:  
H1: The SEC’s issuance of Regulation G/C&DIs does not change the quality of the total 
exclusions and their components (i.e. special items and other exclusions) from non-
GAAP earnings.  
Under the information hypothesis, if analysts anticipate and can identify all real non-
GAAP exclusions in their expectations, positive non-GAAP exclusions should not be 
associated with a greater incidence of meeting or exceeding analysts’ forecasts. Under the 
opportunism hypothesis, in contrast, managers construct non-GAAP earnings to mislead 
                                                          
10






analysts, resulting in meeting or slightly exceeding analysts’ forecasts (Doyle et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, it is hypothesised (in the null form) as follows: 
H2: Firms using positive exclusions from non-GAAP earnings to increase non-GAAP 
earnings financial metrics are as likely to meet or slightly exceed analysts’ forecasts 
following Regulation G/C&DIs. 
The third hypothesis postulates that both Regulation G and C&DIs improve the quality of 
non-GAAP earnings reported by improving the exclusion process. If, post-regulation, the 
quality of (non-GAAP) earnings has increased, then such earnings can be said to be more 
informative and therefore less ambiguous. Accordingly, under the information hypothesis, a 
stronger market response to earnings announcements would be expected (i.e. a higher ERC). 
In contrast, under the opportunism hypothesis, managers are expected to use the additional 
latitude to exclude recurring expenses and meet the analyst forecasts using exclusions. If 
investors understand this, a lower announcement return is expected. Accordingly, the 
market response hypothesis (in the null form) is: 
H3: Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs) for firms in the post-Regulation G period/post-




3. Empirical tests 
With data from IBES, CRSP, and Compustat, the empirical tests examine two distinct 
sample periods, with some overlap. For the Regulation G change, quarterly announcements 
from 1998 to 2008 inclusive (5 years before and 5 years after) are used. For the C&DIs 
change, quarterly announcements from 2005 to 2015 (also 5 years before and after) are 
used.
12
 The final sample includes 69,800 and 67,874 firm-quarter observations respectively, 
with some variation where data for specific variables are not available. 
The use of IBES actual earnings per share (IBES item VALUE) to proxy for the non-GAAP 
earnings figures reported by managers in press releases is consistent with prior research (e.g. 
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 2008; Kyung 
and Weintrop, 2016). IBES uses the quarterly press release as its source for the actual 
earnings per share; Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that over 65 percent of their non-GAAP 




This study estimates a variable, Total_Exclusions as Non_GAAP_Earnings (i.e. Compustat 
actual earnings per share [IBES item VALUE]) less GAAP_Earnings (i.e. earnings per share 
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  H1, H2 and H3 are examined using all firms pre- and post- Regulation G/C&DIs. In additional analyses 
(Section 4.5), the study restricts the sample to only include non-GAAP reporters. 
12
  Removal of 2008 data to eliminate the effects of the global financial crisis did not change the main 
results, and so results with 2008 data are retained. 
13
 Further, investors focus most on IBES derived exclusions, implying that it is most informative to 
determine the underlying reasons for these exclusions, while using IBES actual earnings maximises the 
statistical power of the analysis (Marques, 2006). 
14
 Note that the IBES GAAP dataset is quite sparse. This study initially compares the IBES and Compustat 
GAAP earnings distributions, and finds differences only in the extreme tails. Given the larger number 
of data-points in Compustat, Compustat GAAP earnings are winsorized at 0.001% in each tail, yielding 
a similar distribution to IBES non-GAAP earnings. This winsorized Compustat GAAP number was then 





before extraordinary items from CRSP/Compustat [EPSPXQ]). Following Doyle et al. (2003; 
2013) and Kolev et al. (2008), the variable Special_Items is determined as operating earnings 
per share from Quarterly CRSP/Compustat data (OPEPSQ) less GAAP_Earnings per share. 
Other_Exclusions are determined as Total_Exclusions less Special_Items. A positive value of 
Total_Exclusions, Special_Items and/or Other_Exclusions indicates an income-decreasing 
expense was excluded from non-GAAP Earnings. POST is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the observation falls on or after q1 2003 for Regulation G sample, as well as on or 
after q1 2010 for C&DIs, and zero otherwise, respectively. 
The dependant variable for H1 is SUM_FutOpEarn, determined as operating earnings per 
share from (Compustat item OPEPSQ) summed over quarters q+1 through quarter q+4.
15
 For 
H2, the dependent variable is MEF (Meet or Exceed Analysts’ Forecasts), which is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the current quarter q earnings surprise
16
 is greater than or 
equal to zero, and zero otherwise. Finally, for H3, the dependent variable is 3_day_CAR, 
constructed using a market model estimated from the firm’s value-weighted return 
(inclusive of dividends and other distributions) and the value-weighted S&P 500 as a market 
portfolio from CRSP Daily Stock/Security file, from one day before to one day after the IBES 
earnings announcement date.
17
 Following Doyle et al. (2003; 2013), all continuous 





Control variables are identified based on previous studies (Frankel et al., 2011; Kolev et 
al., 2008) – Growth, Loss, Earnings_Volatility, and Book_to_Market_Assets – each of which 
are anticipated to be correlated with both Non_GAAP_Earnings and Future-
Operating_Earnings.
18
 The analysis further includes the natural logarithm of Total Assets 
(Size) to deal with skewness in the distribution of the dependant variables. To further 
control for size effects in the analysis (following Frankel et al., 2011), variables such as 
SUM_FutOpEarn, GAAP_Earnings, Non_GAAP_Earnings, Total_Exclusions, Special_Items, 
Other_Exclusions, and Growth are standardised by total assets per share. All continuous 
variables are further winsorized at the top and bottom two percent to avoid undue influence 
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 Curtis et al. (2014), Frankel et al. (2011), Kolev et al. (2008) and Kyung and Weintrop (2016) propose 
that this dependent variable is well suited for exploring the research questions since operating 
earnings per share as determined by Quarterly CRSP/Compustat data excludes transitory and non-
recurring special items but contains recurring components that might appear in firms’ other 
exclusions from non-GAAP earnings. As such, it most approximates the notion of more persistent and 
permanent earnings. 
16
 This is constructed as Non_GAAP_Earnings less the median value of IBES actual earnings [IBES item 
MEDEST]. 
17
 This study also undertakes the analyses using raw 3-day returns and market-adjusted 3-day returns, 
using the same market index. As there is no qualitative difference between the results, the study 
reports results using CAR. 
18
 Those control variables are identified as follows, with Quarterly CRSP/Compustat and CRSP Daily 
Stock/Security data: Growth is the increment in sales revenue (CRSP/Compustat item SALEQ) over the 
same quarter in the prior year, scaled by total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets at the end of quarter (CRSP/Compustat item ATQ). Loss is an indicator variable equal to one if 
GAAP_Earnings figure in quarter q is less than zero, and zero otherwise. Earnings_Volatility is the 
standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) [CRSP/Compustat item NIQ divided by CRSP/Compustat 
item ATQ] over the previous two years (i.e. eight preceding quarters). Book_to_Market_Assets is the 
book value of equity (CRSP/Compustat item CEQQ) divided by the book value of debt 
(CRSP/Compustat item DLCQ plus CRSP/Compustat item DLTTQ) plus market value of equity 







 The ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are estimated with robust 
standard errors.  
In this study, high quality exclusions are considered to be those which have the least 
predictive power for future operating earnings, as per Kolev et al. (2008). The average 
quality of exclusions for a period is estimated by determining the strength with which non-
GAAP exclusions map into future earnings. H1 is therefore tested by estimating, separately 
for Regulation G and C&DIs, the following cross-sectional pooled regression equation: 
SUM_FutOpEarnq+1 to q+4 = β0 + β1Non_GAAP_Earnings q + β2Total_Exclusionsq + 
β3POST + β4Total_Exclusionsq × POST + β5Growth + β6Size + β7Loss + 
β8Earnings_Volatility + β9Book_to_Market_Assets + υ q+1 to q+4 (1)  
where: 
SUM_FutOpEarn: operating earnings per share from CRSP/Compustat (OPEPSQ) 
summed over quarters from q+1 through q+4; 
GAAP_Earnings: basic earnings per share before extraordinary items from 
CRSP/Compustat (EPSPXQ); 
Non_GAAP_Earnings: IBES reported actual basic earnings per share (IBES item VALUE); 
Total_Exclusions: Non_GAAP_Earnings less GAAP_Earnings; 
POST: an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm-quarter 
observation occurs after 2003q1 (inclusive, for the Regulation G 
change) or after 2010q1 (inclusive, for the C&DIs change), and zero 
otherwise; 
Special_Items: operating income (CRSP/Compustat item OPEPSQ) less 
GAAP_Earnings from CRSP/Compustat; 
Other_Exclusions: Total_Exclusions less Special_Items; a positive value of 
Total_Exclusions, Special_Items, and/or Other_Exclusions indicates 
an income-decreasing expense was excluded from non-GAAP 
earnings; 
Growth: incremental in sales revenue (CRSP/Compustat item SALEQ) over the 
same quarter in the prior year, standardised by Total Assets; 
Size: natural logarithm of total assets (CRSP/Compustat item ATQ) 
corresponding to quarter q; 
Loss: an indicator variable equal to one if GAAP_Earnings for the quarter is 
less than zero, and zero otherwise; 
Earnings_Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) over preceding eight 
quarters (CRSP/Compustat item NIQ divided by CRSP/Compustat 
item ATQ); and 
Book_to_Market_Assets: book value of equity (CRSP/Compustat item CEQQ) divided by the 
book value of debt (CRSP/Compustat item DLCQ plus 
CRSP/Compustat item DLTTQ) plus market value of equity 
(CRSP/Compustat item PRCCQ multiplied by CRSP/Compustat item 
CSHOQ). 
To determine whether Special_Items and Other_Exclusions have different effects, a 
disaggregated version of Equation 1 is also estimated: 
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 Most previous papers winsorized at the top and bottom one percent, but this study winsorized at two 





SUM_FutOpEarn q + 1 to q + 4 = β0 + β1Non_GAAP_Earnings q + β2Special_Items q + 
β3Other_Exclusions q + β4POST + β5Special_Items q × POST +β6Other_Exclusions q 
× POST + β7Growth + β8Size + β9Loss + β10Earnings_Volatility + 
β11Book_to_Market_Assets + υ q+1 to q+4  (2) 
 
The second hypothesis, H2, addresses whether – irrespective of the intrinsic properties 
of the relationship between exclusions and future earnings – the exclusion process is 
associated with the extent to which realised future earnings relate to expectations, 
measured by analysts’ forecasts. This is articulated as the ability of earnings to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts. If there is an incentive to meet or beat, the use of positive exclusions will 
be more salient for achieving this benchmark, while the use of negative exclusions do not 
aid in doing so. H2 is tested using a probit regression with MEF (meet or beat) as the 
dependant variable, and the same set of explanatory variables. The following equations are 
estimated: 
MEF q = β0 + β1Positive_Total_Exclusions q + β2POST + β3Positive_Total_Exclusions q × 
POST + β4SOX + β5Positive_Total_Exclusions q × SOX + β6Growth + β7Size + 
β8Loss + β9Earnings_Volatility + β10Book_to_Market_Assets + υ q  (3) 
 
MEF q = β0 + β1Positive_Special_Items q + β2Positive_Other_Exclusions q + β3POST + 
β4Positive_Special_Items q × POST + β5Positive_Other_Exclusions q × POST + 
β6SOX + β7Positive_Special_Items q × SOX + β8Positive_Other_Exclusions q × SOX 
+ β9Growth + β10Size + β11Loss + β12Earnings_Volatility + 
β13Book_to_Market_Assets + υ q (4)  
where variables are as previously defined, with the following additional variables: 
MEF:  Meet or Exceed Analysts’ Forecasts, an indicator variable equal 
to one if the current quarter q of earnings surprise (i.e. 
Non_GAAP_Earnings less median IBES actual earnings [IBES item 
MEDEST] as earnings benchmarks) is greater than or equal to 
zero, and zero otherwise; 
Positive_Total_Exclusions: magnitude of positive Total_Exclusions;  
Positive_Special_Items: magnitude of positive Special_Items; 
Positive_Other_Exclusions: magnitude of negative Other_Exclusions; and 
SOX: an indicator variable set to equal one if quarter q is the third 
quarter of 2002, zero otherwise.  
In Equation (3), if the coefficient on the Positive_Total_Exclusions variable (β1) is positive 
and statistically significant in explaining the current quarter of MEF (Meet or Exceed 
Analysts’ Forecasts), this indicates that firms using positive exclusions from non-GAAP 
earnings tend to meet or exceed expectations more often in the pre-event periods. 
While H1 is similar to Kolev et al. (2008), this study extends their analyses to consider 
whether C&DIs also impact on the quality of non-GAAP exclusions. While H2 is similar to 
Heflin and Hsu (2008), the study extends their work by investigating how Regulation G and 
C&DIs impact on the use of positive exclusions to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Finally, 
H3 extends the investigation – beyond consideration of how the non-GAAP announcement 





interventions have had on price informativeness of earnings, through ERCs. The extent of 
the change in ERCs will depend on the level of exclusions, i.e. the extent to which profits are 
adjusted for the announcement. Thus, indicator variables are included for positive 
exclusions to examine the effect of firms using income-increasing exclusions, in comparison 
to those without, as follows: 
3_day_CAR q = β0 + β1Surprise q + β2Positive_Total_Exclusions q + β3POST + β4Surprise q 
× POST + β5Growth + β6Size + β7Loss + β8Earnings_Volatility + 
β9Book_to_Market_Assets + υ q  (5) 
 
3_day_CAR q = β0 + β1Surprise q + β2Positive_Special_Items q + 
β3Positive_Other_Exclusions q + β4POST + β5Surprise q × POST + β6Growth + 
β7Size + β8Loss + β9Earnings_Volatility + β10Book_to_Market_Assets +υ q (6) 
 
where variables are as previously defined, with the following additional variables: 
3_day_CAR:  aggregates Cumulative Abnormal Residuals (CAR) over 3 days 
surrounding the earnings announcement, using parameters constructed 
using a market model estimated (over days –150 to –20 relative to the 
announcement) from the firm’s value-weighted return (inclusive of 
dividends and other distributions) and the value-weighted S&P 500 as a 
market portfolio from CRSP Daily Stock/Security file; and 
Surprise:  a firm's earnings surprise (Non_GAAP_Earnings less the consensus 
median earnings forecast [IBES item MEDEST]) divided by the firm's 
market price (CRSP/Compustat item PRCCQ).  
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main dependent and independent 
variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom two percent to 
mitigate the effects of extreme outliers. For the Regulation G sample (69,800 firm-quarter 
observations), the mean (median) GAAP_Earnings per share is 0.0039 (0.0087) and 
Non_GAAP_Earnings per share is 0.0052 (0.0076). This indicates that Non_GAAP_Earnings, 
on average, exceed GAAP_Earnings. The mean of Total_Exclusions, Special_Items, and 
Other_Exclusions is 0.0013, 0.0031 and -0.0017, respectively.
20
  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
For the C&DIs sample (67,874 firm-quarter observations), Non_GAAP_Earnings per share 
has a higher mean (0.0075) and median (0.0100) in the C&DIs sample than the Regulation G 
sample. The mean of Total_Exclusions is also higher in the C&DIs sample. Special_Items are 
larger in magnitude in the Regulation G period than the C&DIs period 0.0031 and 0.0026, 
respectively. However, Other_Exclusions are larger in the C&DIs period (0.0003), compared 
with -0.0017 in the Regulation G period. SUM_FutOpEarn are also larger at 0.0323 for the 
C&DIs period as compared to 0.0267 for the Regulation G period.  
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The mean (median) of Growth is 0.0216 (0.0134) for the Regulation G period and 0.0159 
(0.0093) for the C&DIs period.
21
 Finally, Earnings_Volatility is similar in the Regulation G 
sample and the C&DIs sample. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) indicate that firms with high 
earnings volatility (e.g. IT technology and pharmaceutical firms with high R&D) are more 
likely to be associated with the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings.  
Descriptive statistics are reported for raw 3-day returns (3_day_RAW) and 3-day market 
adjusted returns (3_day_MAR), as well as 3-day CARs (3_day_CAR). The remainder of the 
study reports results using only 3_day_CAR, as results using the other return measures (not 
tabulated) are qualitatively the same. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 2 presents a pairwise correlation matrix with the main dependent and 
independent variables. Total_Exclusions are negatively correlated with GAAP_Earnings for 
Regulation G (ρ = –0.6798) and C&DIs (ρ = –0.6568). This suggests that poorly performing 
firms (based on operating earnings) are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. 
SUM_FutOpEarn are positively correlated with GAAP_Earnings for Regulation G (ρ = 0.7631) 
and C&DIs (ρ = 0.7321), and are more strongly positively correlated with 
Non_GAAP_Earnings for Regulation G (ρ = 0.7899) and C&DIs (ρ = 0.7909). This is consistent 
with prior research (e.g. Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Frankel and 
Roychowdhury, 2005) that Non_GAAP_Earnings are more permanent and relevant than 
GAAP_Earnings in a firm’s valuation.  
Further, Total_Exclusions and SUM_FutOpEarn are negatively correlated for Regulation 
G (ρ = –0.3322) and C&DIs (ρ = –0.2416); this is consistent with Kolev et al. (2008) who also 
find non-GAAP earnings may eliminate income-decreasing expenses associated with 
SUM_FutOpEarn. Moreover, Special_Items are negatively correlated with GAAP_Earnings 
and Non_GAAP_Earnings for both SEC events. MEF is positively correlated with 
Non_GAAP_Earnings (ρ = 0.1541) but negatively correlated with Total_Exclusions (ρ = –
0.0638), and positively correlated with SUM_FutOpEarn (ρ = 0.1204) and GAAP_Earnings (ρ 
= 0.1483) for the Regulation G period. This suggests that meeting or exceeding analysts’ 
forecasts is associated with both Non_GAAP_Earnings and GAAP_Earnings, although the 
non-GAAP correlation appears greater. Similar results for MEF correlation with above 
variables appear in the C&DIs sample. Finally, Surprise is positively correlated with 
3_day_CAR in both event periods. 
4.2 Results for H1 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 3 presents the results for H1, which considers how exclusions map into future 
earnings. Cross-sectional pooled OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. 
Total_Exclusions are negatively related with SUM_FutOpEarn for both Regulation G (–0.0086) 
and C&DIs (–0.0065). This suggests that non-GAAP exclusions are not perfectly transitory 
items (i.e. recurring items) during both SEC interventions.  
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 Kolev et al. (2008) find that the mean (median) sales growth is 0.387 (0.160) for the Regulation G 
period. When this study calculates growth using Kolev et al. (2008)’s method, a similar mean (median) 
of 0.31 (0.05) across both samples are obtained. However, Kolev et al. (2008)’s calculation involves 
taking a difference in sales dollars and dividing by the number of shares, yielding a dollar 
dimensionality rather than a dimensionless number. Growth is calculated by dividing change in dollar 





Further, the interaction variable between Total_Exclusions and POST tests whether the 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings has enhanced the quality of non-GAAP exclusions following 
the implementation of Regulation G and C&DIs. The coefficient on this interaction is positive 
and significant in both the Regulation G and C&DIs periods; comparing magnitudes, the 
effect of this interaction on non-GAAP exclusions is to make the latter less negative. This 
indicates that the quality of exclusions from non-GAAP earnings is significantly improved in 
the period after each SEC intervention (i.e. where more transitory items are excluded). Thus, 
this result is consistent with the information hypothesis, which posits that the quality of 
non-GAAP earnings exclusions has been enhanced after Regulation G and C&DIs. 
H1 also considers whether Regulation G and C&DIs affect the quality of the exclusion 
components (i.e. Special_Items and Other_Exclusions). The coefficients on Special_Items are 
positive and significant at the one percent level for both Regulation G and C&DIs (0.0006 
and 0.0012, respectively). The interaction between Special_Items and POST is negative and 
significant for the C&DIs period (-0.0003). Thus, the sum of Special_Items and this 
interaction term becomes less positive after the introduction of C&DIs. This suggests that 
the quality of Special_Items enhances after the introduction of C&DIs, as the amount of 
excluded special items post-implementation is less informative about future earnings.
22
 
Doyle et al. (2003) and Doyle et al. (2013) argue that Other_Exclusions are considered as 
low-quality exclusions because those are significantly predictive for SUM_FutOpEarn, 
determined by managers’ own voluntary discretions, and used opportunistically to mislead 
investors before the SEC intervention. The coefficients on Other_Exclusions are negative and 
significant at the one percent level for both Regulation G and C&DIs (-0.0091 and -0.0076, 
respectively). The interaction variables between Other_Exclusions and POST are positive 
(0.0012 and 0.0013) and significant for both Regulation G and C&DIs. These results suggest 
that the quality of Other_Exclusions has improved following Regulation G and C&DIs (i.e. 
more transitory items in the Other_Exclusions component). These results are consistent with 
Kolev et al. (2008) who find Other_Exclusions are more transitory after Regulation G.  
In addition to the mapping of exclusions into future operating earnings, this study also 
tests how exclusions map into future returns. Specifically, the study examines the 3-day CAR 
at the q+4 (Future4CAR3), as well as at q+1 (Future1CAR3). Results are shown in Tables 4 
and 5 respectively. For Future4CAR3, there is a negative relationship with Total_Exclusions 
before Regulation G (-0.0004) and C&DIs (-0.0003). While the incremental coefficient is 
enough to reverse the sign of the coefficient for C&DIs (Total_Exclusions –0.0003; 
Total_Exclusions×POST 0.0006), the magnitude for Regulation G is unchanged 
(Total_Exclusions –0.0004; Total_Exclusions×POST is not significant). This suggests that 
investors are partly “fooled” by the exclusion process around Regulation G and before C&DIs 
(not after).  
The results for Future1CAR3 (the subsequent quarter, Table 5) show there is a negative 
relationship with Total_Exclusions and their components before Regulation G, and the 
incremental coefficient does not change this (Total_Exclusions×POST is not significant). The 
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 In contrast, Kolev et al. (2008) finds that the coefficient on special items is significantly positive and 
the estimated coefficient on the interaction between special items and POST is negative and 
significant. Although the signs are different, the reduction in the overall strength of the relationship 
between special items and future earnings is consistent with special item removal enhancing the 





coefficients on Total_Exclusions and Total_ExclusionsxPOST are, however, not significant for 
C&DIs.  
The quarter +4 results indicate that around Regulation G and before C&DIs, price seems 
to incorrectly impound the information content of announced earnings, since the price 
response four quarters later seems to be related to the components of the originally 
announced earnings. The lack of change to the quarter+1 announcement should, however, 
be interpreted with care as there may be other, seasonal/quarterly factors that impact on 
this lack of relationship. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
In both Regulation G and C&DIs for each forward CAR measure, there is (with the 
exception of Future4CAR3 for the Regulation G Total_Exclusions model) a significant 
negative coefficient on POST; this suggests that market response to subsequent 
announcements is reduced after Regulation G and C&DIs. This pattern suggests that 
exclusions allow investors to anticipate future announcements, leading to a lower future 
(q+1, q+4) response after Regulation G and C&DIs. 
4.3 Results for H2 
Table 6 presents the results for H2, which hypothesises that firms using positive 
exclusions from non-GAAP earnings to increase non-GAAP earnings financial metrics are as 
likely to meet or slightly exceed analysts’ forecasts following Regulation G and the SEC’s 
issuance of C&DIs. A probit regression is used to examine the effect of non-GAAP exclusions 
on the probability of exceeding consensus forecasts. If managers opportunistically report 
non-GAAP earnings to meet or slightly exceed analysts’ forecasts, one would expect a 
positive relation between positive exclusions and the MEF dependent variable (e.g. Doyle et 
al., 2013). The main independent indicator variable, Positive_Total_Exclusions, is equal to 
the magnitude of total exclusions. The coefficient for this variable is significantly positive for 
both Regulation G (3.7230) and C&DIs (2.1068). 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
This suggests that, prior to Regulation G and C&DIs, the use of positive total exclusions 
helps firms meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. When Total_Exclusions is replaced by 
Special_Items and Other_Exclusions, both the special items and other exclusions 
components are associated with meet or beat prior to both Regulation G (coefficient on 
Special_Items 3.8188; coefficient on Other_Exclusions 3.8577) and the introduction of the 
C&DIs (coefficients 2.4305 and 4.4667, respectively). 
Furthermore, this study finds that Regulation G reduced the use of total exclusions to 
meet or beat forecasts: the significant coefficient on the interaction term 
Positive_Total_Exclusions×POST (–0.5639), when added to the coefficient on 
Positive_Total_Exclusions significantly reduces the total coefficient. The study finds similar 
results on Positive_Special_Items×POST (-0.8765). For the C&DIs sample, all interactions are 
positive. Overall, the results suggest that firms using positive non-GAAP earnings exclusions, 
particularly to increase non-GAAP earnings metrics, are less likely to meet or exceed analysts’ 
forecasts following Regulation G, but that C&DIs relax the environment, enabling the use 





4.4 Results for H3 
Table 7 presents the results for H3. The dependent variable, 3_day_CAR is defined as the 
aggregated 3-day excess return around the announcement. Following Doyle et al. (2003; 




). Earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are the coefficients on earnings Surprise, 
while the coefficient on Surprise×POST represents the change in ERC post-SEC interventions. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
The sample includes firms that report non-GAAP earnings and firms that choose not to. 
The study also examines whether the effect on ERC is driven by firms that utilise non-GAAP 
earnings in their reports. In Table 7, an interaction term between Surprise×POST is included, 
as well as a three-way interaction of these components with an indicator variable reflecting 
the use of non-GAAP numbers (NonGAAPusage defined as zero if GAAP earnings are equal 
to announced non-GAAP earnings, one otherwise). This three-way interaction term 
(NONGAAPusage×Surprise×POST) is significantly positive for Regulation G (0.2212) and 
negative for C&DIs (-0.2253). The results suggests that post-Regulation G, the ERCs of firms 
reporting non-GAAP earnings increased substantially more than for those that did not, 
indicating that Regulation G increased the quality of earnings. In contrast, for C&DIs, the 
coefficient on the three-way-interaction is negative, suggesting that the relaxation of 
regulation afforded through the C&DIs resulted in less informative earnings for firms that 
report non-GAAP earnings. 
4.5 Additional analyses 
Additional analyses were undertaken to further determine the robustness of the results. 
These include: analysis with both winsorized and unwinsorized variables (except for 
exclusions); explicit one-way (firm) and two-way (firm and year) clustering of standard errors; 
and analysing only those firms which are users of non-GAAP reporting, where this is defined 
as having non-zero exclusions for at least 80 percent of quarters preceding each SEC 
intervention. The main results reported in this study do not change. To confirm the integrity 
of the dataset used in this study, replications of Doyle et al. (2013) and Heflin and Hsu (2008) 
are conducted which yield consistent results. 
Mapping exclusions into future returns, rather than future earnings, was also explored as 
an alternative method of assessing their information content. The results (not tabulated) 
indicate a significant and consistent set of results for total exclusions when mapping into 
post-Regulation G returns over 4 years and 1 year, but not over the ensuing quarter. The 
results are not consistent for C&DIs. As the discussion in this study focuses on the properties 
of accounting numbers rather than the process of markets impounding this information, 
only the mapping of exclusions into future earnings around Regulation G and C&DIs has 
been reported. Nonetheless, the inconsistency around C&DIs reinforced the overall findings 
of this study – the regulatory effect of Regulation G was more pronounced than that of the 
C&DIs. 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines a number of consequences of non-GAAP disclosure resulting from 
changes to SEC regulatory and interpretive guidance (i.e. Regulation G and C&DIs). This 





earnings exclusions. This study contributes to the existing literature by documenting that 
C&DIs (despite not being a formal regulation) are also associated with an increase in the 
quality of non-GAAP exclusions. Furthermore, the study investigates whether Regulation G 
and C&DIs decrease the probability of firms using positive exclusions to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts. Results indicate that while Regulation G decreased the amount of total 
positive exclusions used to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, C&DIs relaxed the effect of 
Regulation G, increasing the amount of exclusions used to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
Finally, it is hypothesised that the market response, measured as earnings response 
coefficients (ERCs), will change. However, this change will be conditional upon the extent to 
which the market is able to incorporate the higher quality information into the expectation-
forming process. The study finds an increase in the ERCs during the post-Regulation G period, 
but a reduction post-C&DIs period for firms using non-GAAP earnings. 
Overall, results suggest that while Regulation G had its intended effects, results on C&DIs 
are mixed. An interesting tension arises from these mixed results. On the one hand, the 
introduction of C&DIs was to reduce compliance burden, and the results suggest that the 
introduction of C&DIs was successful in doing so in terms of an increase in the quality of 
exclusions. However, C&DIs also resulted in an increase in the use of positive exclusions to 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts and lower ERCs which highlight the unintended 
consequences of this regulatory intervention. As the results on C&DIs are mixed, future 
research is needed to further understand the costs and the benefits associated with the 
introduction of C&DIs. 
A key limitation of this study is the use of IBES actual earnings figures as a proxy for non-
GAAP earnings. This method provides less accurate information about the incidence of 
disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures, as it has been established there is a significant 
difference between IBES actual earnings and the earnings figures reported by firms in their 
press releases (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Another limitation of the study is the use of future 
operating earnings as a measure for current disclosure relevance. This is only a valid 
approach if financial information users fixate on earnings, with non-GAAP earnings being 
considered as “true earnings” with a measurement error. Fixation means that investors 
fixate upon earnings and fail to attend separately to its components, whether these are non-
GAAP earnings and exclusions, or cash flows and accruals. If one of the components (non-
GAAP earnings or cash flow) provides a better forecast of future operating earnings than the 
other (accruals or exclusions), investors who neglect this distinction become overly 
optimistic about the future prospects of firms with high accruals or exclusions, and overly 
pessimistic about the future prospect of firms with low accruals or exclusions. As a result, 
the former become overvalued, and subsequently earn low abnormal returns, while the 
latter become undervalued and are followed by high abnormal returns. The extension 
provided in this study, using ERCs (which reflect a real market-formed consensus between 
investors), examines these phenomena while addressing the fixation issue. Alternative 
future return metrics have also been considered. 
This study has addressed the usefulness of non-GAAP earnings in terms of how such 
earnings, in the presence of exclusions, map into future earnings. Future research may 
address the degree to which current disclosures are informative about future cash flows (e.g. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Regulation G and C&DIs samples 
 Regulation G  C&DIs 
Variables N Mean  Median Std. Dev.  N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
SUM_FutOpEarn 69800 0.0267 0.0372 0.1133  67874 0.0323 0.0405 0.1082 
Future4car3 68575 0.0013 0.0003 0.0773  66541 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0754 
Future1car3 69593 0.0017 0.0007 0.0778  67632 0.0017 0.0000 0.0758 
GAAP_Earnings 69800 0.0039 0.0087 0.0370  67874 0.0046 0.0092 0.0363 
Non_GAAP_Earnings 69800 0.0052 0.0076 0.0279  67874 0.0075 0.0100 0.0278 
Total_Exclusions  (all) 69800 0.0013 0.0000 0.0186  67874 0.0029 0.0000 0.0190 
  (non-zero only) 52673 0.0017 -0.0005 0.0214  51816 0.0038 0.0002 0.0217 
Special_Items  (all) 69800 0.0031 0.0000 0.0400  67874 0.0026 0.0000 0.0282 
  (non-zero only) 23046 0.0092 0.0014 0.0692  29174 0.0061 0.0012 0.0428 
Other_Exclusions  (all) 69800 -0.0017 -0.0001 0.0368  67874 0.0003 0.0000 0.0237 
  (non-zero only) 54373 -0.0022 -0.0007 0.0416  54250 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0265 
Growth 69800 0.0216 0.0134 0.0505  67874 0.0159 0.0093 0.0485 
Size 69800 6.7796 6.6658 1.7972  67874 7.1458 7.0828 1.8248 
Loss 69800 0.2129 0.0000 0.4093  67874 0.2127 0.0000 0.4092 
Earnings_Volatility 69800 0.0198 0.0094 0.02900  67874 0.0199 0.0091 0.0294 
Book_to_Market_Assets 69800 0.3718 0.3253 0.2375  67874 0.4036 0.3526 0.2580 
MEF 69800 0.5420 1.0000 0.4982  67874 0.5773 1.0000 0.4940 
3_day_MAR 69800 0.0031 0.0022 0.0776  67874 0.0020 0.0003 0.0756 
3_day_CAR 69800 0.0017 0.0008 0.0775  67874 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0755 
3_day_RAW 69800 0.0035 0.0019 0.0805  67874 0.0029 0.0014 0.0791 
Surprise 69800 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0095   67874 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0108 
These are the pre-winsorized data. GAAP_Earnings: basic earnings per share before extraordinary items from CRSP/Compustat (EPSPXQ); 
SUM_FutOpEarn: operating earnings per share from CRSP/Compustat (OPEPSQ) summed over quarters from q+1 through q+4; Future4car3: 3-
day cumulative abnormal return around q+4; Future1car3: 3-day cumulative abnormal return around q+1; GAAP_Earnings: basic earnings per 
share before extraordinary items from CRSP/Compustat (EPSPXQ); Non_GAAP_Earnings: IBES reported actual basic earnings per share (IBES 
item VALUE); Total_Exclusions: Non_GAAP_Earnings less GAAP_Earnings; Special_Items: operating income (CRSP/Compustat item OPEPSQ) 
less GAAP_Earnings; Other_Exclusions: Total_Exclusions less Special_Items; a positive value of Total_Exclusions, Special_Items, and/or 
Other_Exclusions indicates an income-decreasing expense was excluded from non-GAAP earnings; Growth: incremental sales revenue 
(CRSP/Compustat item SALEQ) over the same quarter in the prior year, on a per share basis; Size: natural logarithm of total assets 
(CRSP/Compustat item ATQ) corresponding to quarter q; Loss: an indicator variable equal to one if GAAP_Earnings for the quarter is less than 
zero, and zero otherwise; Earnings_Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) over preceding eight quarters (CRSP/Compustat 
item NIQ divided by CRSP/Compustat item ATQ); Book_to_Market_Assets: book value of equity (CRSP/Compustat item CEQQ) divided by the 
book value of debt (CRSP/Compustat item DLCQ plus CRSP/Compustat item DLTTQ) plus market value of equity (CRSP/Compustat item PRCCQ 
multiplied by CRSP/Compustat item CSHOQ); MEF (Meet or Exceed Analysts’ Forecasts): is a dependent indicator variable equal to one if the 
current quarter q of earnings surprise (i.e. Non_GAAP_Earnings less median IBES actual earnings [IBES item MEDEST] as earnings benchmarks) 
is greater than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise; 3_day_MAR (Market-Adjusted Return): the sum of difference between firm’s value-
weighted return, inclusive of dividends and other distributions, from one day before to one day after the IBES earnings announcement date, 
less the return on the value-weighted market portfolio; 3_day_CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Residuals): the aggregated abnormals for days –
1..+1 around the announcement, calculated from a market model regression estimated over trading days –150..–20 in relation to the 
announcement; 3_day_RAW (Raw Return): the aggregated raw return, for day –1 to day +1 around the announcement; Surprise: a firm's 
earnings surprise (Non_GAAP_Earnings less the consensus median earnings forecast [IBES item MEDEST]) divided by firm's market price 
(CRSP/Compustat item PRCCQ).  
Note (1): A comparison of GAAP earnings from Compustat and IBES reveals that the Compustat GAAP earnings have much more extremes in 
the tails as compared to IBES data. However, the Compustat data is much more complete, and so Compustat GAAP earnings are used in order 
to maximise the sample size Comparison of the two distributions (Compustat GAAP earnings and IBES GAAP earnings) indicates that the 
distributions vary only in the extremes; these differences are removed by the winsorization process. Thus, GAAP Earnings is the Compustat 

































SUM_FutOpEarn 1.0000                
Future4car3 0.0478
***
































 1.0000           
Special_Items -0.0829
***



















 1.0000         
Growth 0.2302
***







































































 1.0000     
Book_to_Market_Assets -0.1505
***


































































































                 


























SUM_FutOpEarn 1.0000                
Future4car3 0.0492
***


























































 1.0000         
Growth 0.1926
***







































































 1.0000     
Book_to_Market_Assets -0.0963
***




































































































Variables are defined in Table 1. There are a maximum of 84,062 firm-quarters for each variable for Regulation G sample and 68,210 firm-quarters for C&DIs.  








Table 3: Future operating earnings on exclusions and control variables (H1) 
Dependent Variable: SUM_FutOpEarn 
 Regulation G  C&DIs 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 


























 (0.000)  (0.000)  





















 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 





 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Special_Items × POST  0.0003  -0.0003
**
 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 























































 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.492 0.501  0.467 0.479 
Number of Firm-Quarters 69,800 69,800  67,874 67,874 
POST: an indicator variable that equals one if the observation falls after q1 2003 for Regulation G sample, as 
well as after q1 2010 for C&DIs sample, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 1. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 2%. Robust standard errors are reported below the 









Table 4: 3-day CAR in q+4 on exclusions and control variables (H1) 
Dependent Variable: Future4CAR3 
 Regulation G  C&DIs 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
 (std error.) (std error.)  (std error.) (std error.) 
Intercept 0.0016 0.0023 0.0025 0.0028 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non_GAAP_Earnings -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 






 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Special_Items   0.0002  0.0004
***
 






  (0.000)  (0.000) 





 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total_Exclusions × POST  -0.0003  0.0006
***
  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Special_Items × POST  -0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Other_Exclusions × POST   -0.0002  0.0005
**
 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Growth -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
















 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 





 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book_to_Market_Assets 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.002 0.002  0.001 0.001 
Number of Firm-Quarters 68,575 68,575  66,541 66,541 
POST: an indicator variable that equals one if the observation falls after q1 2003 for Regulation G sample, as 
well as after q1 2010 for C&DIs, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 1. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 2%. Robust standard errors are reported below the 






Table 5: 3-day CAR in q+1 on exclusions and control variables (H1) 
Dependent Variable: Future1CAR3 
 Regulation G  C&DIs 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
 (std error.) (std error.)  (std error.) (std error.) 
Intercept 0.0007 0.0032
*
 0.0016 0.0024 










 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total_Exclusions -0.0007
***
  -0.0000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  





















 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total_Exclusions × POST  0.0002  0.0002  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Special_Items × POST  -0.0001  -0.0003
*
 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Other_Exclusions × POST   0.0004  0.0005
**
 


















 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss -0.0000 -0.0011 0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Earnings_Volatility -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 





 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.002 0.002  0.000 0.001 
Number of Firm-Quarters 69,593 69,593  67,632 67,632 
POST: an indicator variable that equals one if the observation falls after q1 2003 for Regulation G sample, as 
well as after q1 2010 for C&DIs, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 1. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 2%. Robust standard errors are reported below the 








Table 6: Probit regressions of ‘meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts’ (MEF) on exclusion variables (H2) 
Dependent Variable: MEF      
 Regulation G  C&DIs 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 






















  (5.0100)  (3.3400) 










   
 (-31.1900) (-29.2600)   
POST 0.0089 0.0064 0.0313 0.0281 
 (0.3100) (0.2100) (0.4500) (0.4100) 
Positive_Total_Exclusions × SOX  1.0462
***
    
 (10.4500)    
Positive_Special_Items × SOX  1.6222
***
   
  (16.4000)   
Positive_Other_Exclusions × SOX  -0.3059
**
   
  (-2.0500)   





 (-1.6900)  (3.1100)  





  (-3.0500)  (1.9400) 
Positive_Other_Exclusions × POST   0.2441  2.8929
***
 










 (13.6600) (13.6300) (4.2700) (4.1600) 
Size 0.0001 0.0015 -0.0111 -0.0094 


















 (5.4700) (5.0400) (1.6800) (1.3700) 
Book_to_Market_Assets -0.0829 -0.0709 -0.1153
*
 -0.0937 
 (-1.2100) (-1.0500) (-1.7900) (-1.4700) 
Pseudo-R
2 
 0.0586 0.0597 0.0577 0.0602 
Number of Firm-Quarters 19,991 19,991 26,786 26,786 
Positive_Total_Exclusions: equal to the magnitude of Total_Exclusions if Total_Exclusions are greater than zero, and 
zero otherwise; Positive_Special_Items: equal to the magnitude of Special_Items if greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise; Positive_Other_Exclusions: equal to the magnitude of Other_Exclusions if greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise. POST: an indicator variable that equals one if the observation falls after q1 2003 for Regulation G 
sample, as well as after q1 2010 for C&DIs, and zero otherwise. SOX is an indicator variable defined by Heflin and 
Hsu (2008) for quarters on or after 2002Q3. The POST variable here is equivalent to theirs. Other variables are 
defined in Table 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 2%. Robust standard errors are 
reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-






Table 7: Market reaction to earnings announcement (H3), with NonGAAPusage×Surprise×Post 
interaction 
Dependent Variable: 3_day_CAR 
 Regulation G  C&Dis 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 




















 (0.064) (0.064)  (0.050) (0.050) 
Positive_Total_Exclusions_i  -0.0035
***
   -0.0040
***
  
 (0.001)   (0.001)  
Positive_Special_Items_i   0.0009   0.0020
**
 
  (0.001)   (0.001) 
Positive_Other_Exclusions_i   -0.0047
***
   -0.0053
***
 










 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 









 (0.107) (0.107)  (0.098) (0.099) 









 (0.108) (0.108)  (0.103) (0.103) 
Positive_Total_Exclusions_i × POST  -0.0015   -0.0006  
 (0.002)   (0.001)  
Positive_Special_Items_i × POST   0.0002   -0.0042
***
 
  (0.002)   (0.001) 
Positive_Other_Exclusions_i × POST   -0.0011   0.0022
*
 






























 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 















 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.034 0.034  0.050 0.050 
Number of Firm-Quarters 69,800 69,800  67,874 67,874 
3_day_CAR: constructed using a market model estimated from the firm’s value-weighted return (inclusive of dividends and other 
distributions) and the value-weighted S&P 500 as a market portfolio from CRSP Daily Stock/Security file, from one day before to one 
day after the IBES earnings announcement date; Surprise: a firm's earnings surprise divided by firm's market price; NonGAAPusage 
is 0 if GAAP earnings are equal to “non-GAAP” announced earnings, 1 otherwise; Positive_Total_Exclusions_i: an indicator variable 
equal to one if Total_Exclusions are greater than zero, and zero otherwise; Positive_Special_Items_i: an indicator variable equal to 
one if Special_Items are greater than zero, and zero otherwise; Positive_Other_Exclusions_i: an indicator variable equal to one if 
Other_Exclusions are greater than zero, and zero otherwise. POST: an indicator variable that equals one if the observation falls after 
q1 2003 for Regulation G sample, as well as after q1 2010 for C&DIs, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 1. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 2%. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. *, **, 
and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
